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RES JUDICATA: A FOREIGN LAWYER'S
IMPRESSIONS OF SOME LOUISIANA
PROBLEMS
K. D. Kerameus*
This article describes some comparative impressions on
the Louisiana aspects of the law of res judicata,' touching
upon four topics as they appear to a lawyer trained exclu-
sively within the Continental framework. The first three,
identity of the parties, identity of the thing demanded and
identity of the cause of action, constitute explicit prerequi-
sites of the binding effect of judicial decisions as res judicata;
the fourth, collateral estoppel, amounts to an expansion of
the conclusive effect of prior adjudication on a narrower
basis.
Identity of the Parties
Modern discussions of the party identity rule show two
parallel tendencies: (a) to eliminate this requirement when
one of the parties in the present suit was also a party in the
former suit and lost against a person in a position similar to
that of his present opponent (e.g., multi-victim tort actions);
and (b) more generally, to abolish the mutuality of estoppel
doctrine, which refuses to make the extent of res judicata
dependent upon the outcome of the litigation, thereby pre-
cluding the defeated party even against third persons not
participating in the prior litigation, as in the landmark
California case of Bernhard v. Bank of America National
Trust and Savings Association.2 Louisiana, like most Conti-
nental legal systems, does not take much notice of either of
these tendencies. The similarity within the civilian tradition
goes even further and embraces also the case in which the
* Professor of Law, University of Thessaloniki, Greece; visiting Professor
of Law, Louisiana State University, fall semester 1974.
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2286. This is the same as FRENCH CIv. CODE art.
1351: "L'autoritd de la chose jugge n'a lieu qu'd l'gard de ce qui afait l'objet du
jugement. Il faut que la chose demandge soit la mgme; que la demande soit
fond~e sur la mgme cause; que la demande soit entre les mgmes parties, et
forte par elles et contre elles en la mgme qualitk." For a brief discussion see
J. VINCENT, PROCADURE CIVILE 86-94 (16th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
VINCENT]. See Comment, Louisiana Concept of Res Judicata, 34 LA. L. REV.
763 (1974); Comment, Res Judicata-Matters Which Might Have Been Pleaded, 2
LA. L. REV. 347 and 491 (1940).
2. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
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parties now facing each other in litigation were in the previous
suit codefendants against a common claimant. Such situa-
tions arise often in automobile accidents involving more than
two cars. In Europe, the plea of res judicata would in most
circumstances be rejected because the parties are certainly
the same, but they were not in an adverse position during the
former suit.3 From the' recent cases of Harper v. Hunt4 and
Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company v. Hardware Deal-
ers Mutual Fire Insurance Company,5 it would seem that the
same solution would also be valid under Louisiana law. In the
latter case, the court stated that the judgment to share costs
among codefendants was "not necessarily an adjudication of
all the issues as between the said codefendants."' 6 Thus there
arises the question of attributing a binding effect to the pre-
vious litigation at least in cases where all issues, especially as
to the former codefendants' relative negligence, were then
hotly contested between them. Such a solution might require
the judge in the later suit to conduct laborious investigations
into the former proceedings, in order to ascertain the degree
of adversity in the respective positions taken by the codefen-
dants. If this solution were to be adopted, the prospective
parties to a lawsuit would be left without sufficient guidance
as to the potential success of instituting a new suit against
each other. As one of the main res judicata policies is to
obtain stability of legal relationships and predictability in the
judicial process, such a result which leaves the decision on res
judicata practically to the discretion of the judge in the sub-
sequent action, would be highly undesirable.
There may' be some criticism that the scope of res
judicata in Louisiana with regard to actions in rem is too
narrow. If it focuses on the case of Durmeyer v. Streiffer,7 the
criticism is incorrect. In Durmeyer the court correctly denied
the conclusiveness against all the world of a judgment in rem
relating to title in land. The argument that a final judgment
as to the status of a person is res judicata as to all the world
3. See in Switzerland M. GULDENER, SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILPROZESS-
RECHT 308 n.36a (2d ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as GULDENER]; in Gieece 2
ST. STAVROPOULOS, A COMMENTARY TO THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (in
Greek) 507 (1968); in Germany 2 B. WIECZOREK, ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG UND
NEBENGESETZE 724 (1957).
4. 247 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
5. 196 So. 2d 650 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
6. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
7. 215 La. 585, 594, 41 So. 2d 226, 229 (1949).
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does not furnish support in favor of the criticism, because
third persons have rights only in things not in persons. The
status of a person is res judicata as to all the world because
only the person holding the status can assert it.
On the contrary, some doubts might be raised in connec-
tion with the application of the same capacity requirement.
In two Louisiana cases, Lambdin v. Travelers Insurance
Company,8 and Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.,9
suits were filed simultaneously on the same facts and issues.
In each case, however, one suit was filed by a parent as
individual and the other by the parent as tutor of the injured
minor child. A jury in each instance gave recovery in one suit
and not in the other. Only the unsuccessful claims were ap-
pealed, and res judicata did not apply due to a lack of identity
of the parties in their capacity. The court was right in the
first case when speaking of "the irreconcilable conflict be-
tween the verdicts upon the two demands"'10 and denying
nevertheless any binding effects. This reasoning is correct
because it is not the function of res judicata to avoid or
eliminate such grave conflicts in the judicial determination of
facts. According to European doctrine, only legal relation-
ships per se, capable of being judicially determined, can be
covered by res judicata; mere facts do not fall within this
binding effect." A result of this perception is that the res
judicata rules are not considered in Europe,12 as in some
common law jurisdictions, 13 as matters of evidence concern-
ing facts and factual allegations, but are contemplated within
the broad area of the effects of judgments.14
Identity of the Thing
Passing now to the identity of the thing demanded, this
requirement does not seem to cause much trouble in Europe.
8. 150 So. 2d 636 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
9. 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
10. Lambdin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 150 So. 2d 636,639 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
11. See, e.g., ROSENBERG-SCHWAB, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT 832-33 (11th ed.
1974) [hereinafter cited as ROSENBERG-SCHWAB].
12. See 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAIT] PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN-
gAis 1014-15 (2d ed. ESMEIN, RADOUANT AND GABOLDE 1954) [hereinafter cited
as PLANIOL & RIPERT].
13. S. BOWER & A. TURNER, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA 9 (2d ed.
1969).
14. See R. BRUNS, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT: EINE SYSTEMATISCHE DARSTEL-
LUNG 382 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BRUNS]; VINCENT at 86.
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The thing demanded is determined by the final request in
plaintiffs complaint, and coincides with the particular sub-
stantive right the infringement of which brought about the
actual litigation.15 Some major Louisiana cases seem to follow
the same line. The Louisiana Supreme Court said in Quarles
v. Lewis:16 "Since the object of the first suit was to compel a
specific performance whereas this suit is for recovery of dam-
ages resulting from untimely performance, it is clear that the
demand in this suit is not the same as that in the first ac-
tion.' 7 The same substantive foundation justifies distin-
guishing the thing demanded between actions for personal
injury and property damages arising out of one and the same
negligent behavior of the defendant.
The fact that in both suits plaintiff demands a sum of
money or a money judgment,' is not sufficient to assume
identity of the thing demanded; money does not have a rele-
vant identity in itself and it is necessary to examine the under-
lying right of indemnification. On the other hand, the thing
demanded is only the plaintiffs final request and does not
encompass issues which are necessary in order to reach a
decision on the final request. 9
From a continental viewpoint, there is some justified criti-
cism of the language in Heine v. Muse.20 There, a plaintiff had
sued for and obtained a default judgment for the balance of
the purchase price; in the second suit, the former
defendant-now plaintiff-asked for return of the purchase
price and for recovery of damages due to the opponent's mis-
representations that the property sold had been zoned com-
mercial. In sustaining the plea of res judicata, the court
found that the thing demanded in the prior suit was the
15. See A. BLOMEYER, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT: ERKENNTNISVERFAHREN
452-56 (1963) [hereinafter cited as BLOMEYER].
16. 226 La. 76, 75 So. 2d 14 (1954). For a criticism of this case see Com-
ment, Preclusion Devices in Louisiana: Collateral Estoppel, 35 LA. L. REV.
158, 168 n.55, 172 n.73, 173 n.77 (1974). However, the view taken of LA. CIv.
CODE art. 2286 in this Comment does not correspond to either the continental
or in particular the French view of FRENCH CIV. CODE art. 1351 though the
articles are corresponding ones.
17. 226 La. 76, 77, 75 So. 2d 14, 15 (1954).
18. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 51 So. 2d 850, 852
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1951).
19. See BLOMEYER at 457-64; VINCENT at 93.
20. 206 So. 2d 529 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968). I do not intend to touch upon
the specific question of whether preclusion should also arise from a default
judgment.
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"recognition of the validity of the obligation created by the
contract of sale."' 2 1 On the Continent, the validity of this obli-
gation would not be seen as the thing demanded in the first
suit. The thing demanded would be only the balance of the
purchase price, and the validity of the underlying contract
would appear only as a preliminary question to be
answered-as a question pr~judicielle. Whether the buyer is
barred from raising this question in the subsequent suit,
should be a matter of collateral estoppel.
There are two provisions of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure which might appear strange to continental
lawyers. According to article 425, if an obligee brings an ac-
tion to enforce only a portion of the obligation, and does not
amend his pleading to demand the enforcement of the full
obligation, he loses the right to enforce the remaining por-
tion. This article does not deprive the obligee of the rest of
the obligation, it only enjoins its enforcement; in other words,
it develops, like res judicata in general, only procedural, not
substantive effects.
Prior to article 425 there were some Louisiana decisions
which employed res judicata to bar the plaintiff in a second
suit when he had split his cause of action in his first suit. This
usage is contrary to the old doctrine of Pothier 22 which would
have said that res judicata effect is unavailable as there is no
identity of the thing demanded. There does not seem to be
any analogous statutory regulation in continental legal sys-
tems. 23 At the utmost, we would work with the notion of
abuse of right and we could, in extreme situations, bar the
enforcement of the remaining portion if this split does not
correspond to any economic or social need of the creditor.24 It
is understandable that a general statutory prohibition, like
that of article 425, curbs the mass of litigation and makes
considerably easier the court's function in ruling on preclu-
sive effects during an eventual subsequent suit.
The second provision, which is Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 862, states that a final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his
21. Id. at 531.
22. See POTHIER, TRAITI DES OBLIGATIONS 440 (MASSON ed. 1883).
23. See R. GINSBURG & A. BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 309
(1965); GULDENER at 305-06 n.30.
24. But cf. BRUNS at 412-18.
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pleadings and the latter contain no prayer for general and
equitable relief. If by the term "relief" We understand differ-
ent substantive remedies arising out of the same factual
occurrence (e.g., rescission of the contract or recovery of dam-
ages), the result would not only violate the principle of party
presentation but would also run contrary to or, for that pur-
pose, abolish the identity of the thing demanded in the res
judicata doctrine. From the Official Revision Comments to
article 862, however, one may conclude that its main function
consists in suppressing "the harsh and unduly technical
'theory of the case' doctrine,' 25 which would correspond, in
continental terminology, to suppressing the need for a particu-
lar legal qualification of the party's request. Without arguing
for the former or the latter construction, it may be noted that
the latter interpretation would make perfect sense to Euro-
pean eyes.
Identity of the Cause of Action
The problems of legal qualification lead to the third re-
quirement of res judicata: the identity of the cause of action.
French law requires that the cause be the same, in order for
the binding effect of former adjudication to operate. Other
continental legal systems, affected more strongly by German
law, do not speak of the identity of cause, but require that the
substantive right under dispute be the same in both suits. 2
6
Identity of substantive right presupposed until recently a
common legislative source (i.e., the same article or the same
paragraph of a statute). However, in some instances there are
distinct articles which for all practical purposes give rise to
the same right in the sense of a legal power attributed to a
person, with a content and to an extent independent of the
particular statutory article serving as foundation (e.g., recov-
ery of damages because of breach of contract constituting at
the same time a tort). Modern European doctrine is now at
the point of consolidating those distinct articles to a common
legal basis leading to one and the same right.27 This is true
25. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 862, comment b.
26. BLOMEYER at 450-57. For the-somewhat broader Austrian solutions
see 3 H. W. FASCHING, KOMMENTAR ZU DEN ZIVILPROZESSGESETZEN 701-05
(1966).
27. See A. GEORGIADES, DIE ANSPRUCHSKONKURRENZ IM ZIVILRECHT
UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHT (1968) [hereinafter cited as GEORGIADES]. See also
K. D. Kerameus, 23 HARMENOPOULOS (Thessaloniki) 787-95 (1969).
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especially with regard to the scope of res judicata; should the
first suit founded upon the breach of contract be dismissed, a
second action seeking to recover on the ground of tort is
barred. 28 French law has shown a somewhat similar tendency
when developing special rules for actions in nullity requiring
a party to aggregate all his causes of nullity in one suit.29 The
general trend is to enlarge the scope of litigation, in order not
to permit the losing party to escape the res judicata effect
through technical intricacies of the substantive law.
Considered against this brief comparative background,
Louisiana jurisprudence seems to me to follow the same
trend-even if the reasoning is not always similar. For exam-
ple, the Louisiana Supreme Court in the Succession of
Reynolds3" said that "it would be undesirable to hold that a
party could bring suit to invalidate a will on certain grounds,
then, when unsuccessful, institute another suit with the same
object, viz. invalidity of the will, on other grounds, particu-
larly when those grounds and the basis for same existed to
the knowledge of the party at the time the first suit was
brought." 31 As Chief Justice Fournet pointed out in his dis-
sent, this is not the civil law notion of cause; but even this
latter notion seems to advance, somewhat hesitatingly, to
larger units. Certainly, rules of procedure implement the sub-
stantive law, and are not an end in themselves; and article
5051 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure adopts a liberal
construction of procedural provisions. Nevertheless, old and
sometimes obsolete distinctions in the civilian tradition of
substantive law should not be allowed to undermine res
judicata, which reflects an important public policy in favor of
the finality of judicial determination.
Collateral Estoppel
The fourth and last topic is collateral estoppel. This term
does not necessarily mean what is understood in common
law doctrine but mainly a certain expansion of the bind-
ing effects of judgments beyond their object-technically
28. GEORGIADES at 257-58.
29. See P. HERZOG & M. WESER, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 555 n. 23
(1967); 6 PLANIOL & RIPERT at 381; 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT at 1032, 1033 n.1. See
Comment, Preclusion Devices in Louisiana: Collateral Estoppel, 35 LA. L. REV.
158, 166 n.44 (1974).
30. 91 So. 2d 584 (1956).
31. Id. at 587.
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speaking-and into some preliminary issues. Due to the in-
terdependence of legal relationships and the continuously
growing complexity of civil litigation, collateral estoppel
tends more and more to occupy a central position in any
procedural system. A short and oversimplified survey of this
question in most European countries would gather them in
three groups. The first group, including inter alia German and
Italian law,32 restricts the scope of res judicata to the thing
demanded through plaintiff's initial request. Issues decided
explicitly or impliedly by the court in order to reach a judg-
ment on the thing demanded are not- precluded by the binding
effect of the judicial decision, unless either party during the
pending proceedings filed a separate claim, the so-called inci-
dental declaratory action, asking the court to decide spe-
cifically a particular question on whose affirmative or negative
answer depended the outcome of the whole suit. The main
policy underlying this institution of incidental declaratory
action 33 is to cut off any ambiguous and laborious inquiry by
the judge of the second suit into the structure of the first
judgment, the intention of the first judge, or the long set of
pleadings in the first proceeding, and to entrust the scope of
issue preclusion exclusively to the explicit procedural motions
of the parties. By this method, the parties enjoy also a much
better predictability as to whether a second suit would be
available or not.
The second group includes the 1968 Greek Code of Civil
Procedure (in preparation since the early thirties) as a prin-
cipal example. The Greek Code does not recognize the institu-
tion of the incidental declaratory action,34 but, enacting an
earlier jurisprudence constante, bars the relitigation of all
issues decided in the previous adjudication, provided three
requirements are met: (a) these issues must be related to
legal relationships and not to pure facts, i.e., ultimate facts or
evidentiary facts; (b) deciding them was necessary in order to
render a judgment on plaintiff's request; and (c) these issues
fall within the subject-matter competence of the court which
rendered the first judgment.3 5 Thus, under the Greek system,
32. See M. CAPPELLETTI & J. PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 253-54
(1965); ROSENBERG-SCHWAB at 831-32.
33. On the institution in German law see ROSENBERG-SCHWAB at 510-12.
34. See 2 PROJET OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 404 (edited by the
Ministry of Justice, in Greek, 1953); 3 PROJET OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 203-04 (1951).
35. GREEK CODE OF CIV. P. art. 331.
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parties do not have to ask for explicit ascertainment of inci-
dental issues in order to bring about an issue preclusion, yet
the court in the second suit ought always to investigate the
previous proceeding, principally from the viewpoint of a
"necessity" connection between the issues and the final out-
come of the first litigation.
The third group concentrates around French law which
neither knows a formal incidental declaratory action nor
deals in any way with issue preclusion. The scope of res
judicata is governed by article 1351 of the Code Napoleon
which is the same as article 2286 of the Louisiana Civil Code.
Neither Pothier nor the French redactors seem to have con-
sidered this question, in favor or against collateral estoppel.
Nevertheless, when confronted with a plea of res judicata
involving mainly issue preclusion, French courts dwell upon
the real meaning or real scope of the previous judgment, and
search within it for implied decisions of incidental ques-
tions. 36 Thus they often reach what would here be called "issue
preclusion," without using either this term or the expression
collateral estoppel.
Louisiana Developments
Against this somewhat skeleton-like comparative
background, any consideration of the Louisiana jurispru-
dence would raise two questions: (1) is there any issue preclu-
sion in this jurisdiction? and, (2) if so, what would be its legal
foundation? The first question is empirical; the second is doc-
trinal. Without purporting to give an authoritative answer to
these questions, the following observations represent a
foreigner's glimpse into a common problem of the judicial
process.
With reference to the first question, the cases of Califor-
nia Co. v. Price3 7 and State v. Placid Oil Co. 38 both expound
principles of issue preclusion. Nevertheless, doctrinal and
judicial criticism3 9 of the California case pointed out that the
36. See 12 AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRAN(AIS 334-35 (6th ed. ESMEIN
1958); 1 RIPERT & BOULANGER, TRAIT DE DROIT CIVIL IYAPRPS LE TRAITA DE
PLANIOL 319 (1956).
37. 234 La. 338, 99 So. 2d 743 (1957). See Comment, Preclusion Devices in
Louisiana: Collateral Estoppel, 35 LA. L. REV. 158, 167-77 (1974).
38. 300 So. 2d 154, 172 (La. 1974).
39. Shell Oil Co. v. Texas Gas Transmission Corp., 176 So. 2d 692 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1964); The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1957-1958
Term, 19 LA. L. REV. 338, 392 (1959).
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statement on issue preclusion was a mere dictum, since tne
same result could have been reached independently of this
reasoning (i.e., upon the traditional res judicata pattern with
its three identities). However, it is not clear how there was an
identity of the thing demanded. The oil wells, from which the
funds in dispute derived, were not the same in the first and
the second concursus proceedings. Common in both proceed-
ings was only the question concerning the ownership of the
same portion of Grand Bay, but that question was precisely
not the thing demanded either in the first or in the second
proceedings; it was merely a litigated issue in order for the
court to reach judgment, a question pr~judicielle. It is strik-
ing that nobody seems to question the result of the California
case; the discussion concentrates on whether this result
needs issue preclusion as a foundation or may fall within the
legislative scope of res judicata. And it seems to be a perfectly
succinct statement, as Mr. Justice Tate says, "we may or we
may not have judicial estoppel in Louisiana." 40 This general
agreement on the practical extent of the binding effects of
prior proceedings shows clearly the soundness and desirabil-
ity of the result, even for those who oppose the use of collat-
eral estoppel.
The old case of State v. American Sugar Refining Co.41 is
considered to have expunged common law notions of estoppel
from res judicata in Louisiana and to have established conti-
nental doctrine as the authority for the interpretation of
article 2286. Justice Provosty, speaking for a unanimous court
and considering the hypothetical case of two suits on the
several installments of interest on a note, said: "Immediate
payment of the capital would not be demanded, but its recog-
nition as a debt would necessarily constitute the main de-
mand of the suit. Interest would follow as a mere conse-
quence. '42 This perception of (1) the party's actual request as a
mere consequence, and (2) the inquiry into necessary (even if
only implied) presuppositions of the actual demand, as falling
within the binding effect of the judgment, is precisely what
exceeds normal res judicata; according to European terminol-
ogy, this would move into the vast area of preliminary ques-
tions being estopped by the judgment.4
40. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-68 Term, 29
LA. L. REV. 278, 279 (1969).
41. 108 La. 603, 32 So. 965 (1902).
42. Id. at 608, 32 So. 965 at 967.
43. See K. D. KERAMEUS, RES JUDICATA AND PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
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Provosty's other hypothet in the same opinion is still
more characteristic. He writes: "If I break my neighbor's
fence, and to his suit for damages I plead the nonexistence of
any law subjecting me to pecuniary liability in such a case,
and the day after being cast in the suit I break the fence
again under circumstances exactly similar, and another suit
ensues, there will be as close identity between the two suits
as between two suits for the taxes of different years; but we
imagine no one would think of applying the law of res
judicata to the second suit. If, however, in the first suit,
instead of confining myself to denial of plaintiffs claim, I set
up an independent right, justifying my conduct, as that I am
owner of the fence in question, or that I have by contract the
right to break said fence, then, as a matter of course, as to
this defense, if again set up in the second suit, there would be
res judicata; but the reason would be that, while urged as a
defense, this claim of right would in reality be a demand
brought by way of reconvention. I should, pro hac vice, have
ceased to be defendant and become plaintiff; and the neces-
sary feature of identity of demand in the two suits would be
presented. ' '44
It may be noted that even under the modified cir-
cumstances of the hypothet (with an independent right), the
thing demanded itself is not affected; it always remains the
claim of damages because of the broken fence. What Provosty
in reality suggests here is an extension of the binding effects
to a purely preliminary question which, only through Provos-
ty's ingenious but artificial construction, is raised to an ac-
tual demand in order to satisfy the obvious practical need for
preclusion of the issue of the defendant's contractual right.
Concerning the second question: even if issue preclusion
is observed in the judicial practice, where does one look for its
legal foundation under the strict wording of article 2286? This
provision has been controlling res judicata also in France,
where the courts have never ceased to search for implied
decisions of incidental questions in the previous judgment
upon which a plea of res judicata is made.45 For the restric-
tive language of the statutory provision ("the authority of the
thing adjudged takes place only with respect to what was the
object of the judgment") aims to prevent the whole reasoning
(in Greek) 104-13 passim (1967) [hereinafter cited as KERAMEUS].
44. State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 108 La. 603, 613, 32 So. 965, 969
(1902).
45. See text at note 36, supra.
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of the court (with its factual findings and legal holdings)
from being included in res judicata, but does not bar distinc-
tions within the grounds of the judicial decisions; in any
event this does not run against issue preclusion which was
completely unknown in 1804.46 Not only French jurispru-
dence, but also the Greek experience under the old Code of
Civil Procedure containing the same article, show that this
provision and issue preclusion may peacefully coexist to some
extent. Thus, collateral estoppel need not be called "an ill
defined jurisprudential importation from the common law." 47
Conclusion
In brief conclusion one can say that res judicata consti-
tutes an area where many important policies meet and clash
with each other: stability of legal relationships, protection of
acquired rights, judicial peace, dignity of the judiciary, effi-
ciency in the administration of justice. Living in an era of
global phenomena, including massive litigation, one would
not necessarily march against the expansion of res judicata.
Recent developments in common law jurisdictions indicate
that this expansion might well correspond to urgent practical
needs. There remains, however, one important caution: res
judicata has always been an effective tool in promoting not
only consistency but also predictability in the judicial evalua-
tion of relevant human behavior. Yet predictability is ir-
reconcilable with leaving the delineation of the scope of res
judicata to the court in each particular case, according to
standards of substantive justice. Res judicata as an institu-
tion is founded upon the additional possibility of unjust deci-
sions.48 Making a further distinction, it can be stated that to
accept res judicata derived from just decisions and to reject it
when resulting from seemingly unjust ones would undermine
the function of the entire institution and would severely dis-
turb the administration of justice.
46. For a discussion of the pertinent French law at that time see
KERAMEUS at 78-80.
47. See, e.g., Baker v. Wheless Drilling Co., 303 So. 2d 511, 514 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1974).
48. See Hazard, Res Nova in Res Judicata, 44 So. CAL. L. REV. 1036,
1041-42 (1971).
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